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ANTITRuST LAW SURVEY

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Survey examines three recent Tenth Circuit opinions that interpret and apply the federal antitrust laws. These cases were selected
either because they contained unclear analysis or because the standards
articulated were contrary to decisions reached in other courts.
In the first case, Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc.,I the court of appeals
held that employees of an airline allegedly driven into bankruptcy by a
competitor lacked standing to assert antitrust claims against the competitor. The court determined that the employees did not establish antitrust injury by their loss of employment and that any possible injury was
indirect.
The second case, City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co.,2 addressed tying arrangements and the essential facilities doctrine as a
means of showing antitrust violations in the retail natural gas industry.
The Tenth Circuit held that several cities, which had purchased natural
gas from the defendant gas company, failed to show a "severe handicap"
for purposes of recovery under the essential facilities doctrine. Also, the
cities could not prevail on a theory of an illegal tying arrangement between the use of the pipeline and the purchase of gas since they did not
show that the gas company had acted in concert with any other entity.
The third case, TV Communications Network, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc.,3 analyzes the proper definition of the relevant market in the
monopolization context. The court of appeals held that a cable television programmer could not violate the Sherman Act by virtue of the
natural monopoly that it held over its own product. The court refused
to accept the plaintiffs characterization of the relevant market as one
cable television channel.
This Survey also discusses the implications of the Supreme Court's
recent decision, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,4 for
these Tenth Circuit cases. In particular, the Survey will focus on the
impact of the Kodak decision on the standards articulated in Chanute regarding tying arrangements, and in TV Communications Network regarding
the relevant product market.
1. 967 F.2d 404 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 464 (1992).
2. 955 F.2d 641 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992) (Chanute IV). This case
was part of a series of cases between these parties, which included: City of Chanute v.
Williams Natural Gas Co., 678 F. Supp. 1517 (D. Kan. 1988) (Chanute I); City of Chanute
v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,967 (D. Kan. Feb. 16, 1990)
(Chanute II); and City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 743 F. Supp. 1437 (D. Kan.
1990) (Chanute 111). Chanute IV affirmed Chanute II and Chanute IlI.

3. 964 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 601 (1992).
4. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
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ANTITRUST STANDING

In Sharp v. UnitedAirlines, Inc. ,5 the Tenth Circuit analyzed the ability
of employees to obtain relief under the antitrust laws for alleged illegal
behavior directed at their employer by a competitor. The court rejected
such a suit against the competitor primarily because the employees were
6
unable to show antitrust injury, and therefore, lacked standing.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act permits the recovery of damages by any
person "injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." '7 Section 16 of the Clayton Act entitles any
person threatened with "loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust
laws" to obtain an injunction. 8 These sections confer on private parties
the power to enforce the federal antitrust laws, which primarily consist
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 9
Despite the broad language of the Clayton Act, a plaintiffs standing
to sue for monetary damages is subject to several limitations. First, the
plaintiff must show injury to his business or property.10 Second, the
plaintiff must establish an antitrust injury. 1 I Third, the plaintiffs injury
must not be too remote.' 2 The Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit
have incorporated these general limitations into a multi-factor standard.
Courts should consider: the causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation and the harm; the defendant's intent or motivation;
whether the claimed injury is one sought to be redressed by antitrust
laws; the directness of the connection between the plaintiffs injury and
the market restraint resulting from the alleged antitrust violation; the
speculative nature of the damages claimed; and the risk of duplicative
recoveries or complex damages apportionment.' 3 These requirements
are questions of law the court must analyze before determining that a
4
plaintiff has standing to sue for antitrust damages.'
5. 967 F.2d 404 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 464 (1992).
6. Id. at 407.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988).
8. Id. § 26.
9. The term "any person" includes individuals, partnerships, corporations and associations. Id. § 12(a). A successful plaintiff may recover treble damages, costs, reasonable attorney fees, and possibly prejudgment interest. Id. § 15(a).

10. Id. § 15(a). The Court has construed the term "business" broadly to mean "commercial interests or enterprises." See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264
(1972).
11. Sharp, 967 F.2d at 407 n.2.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 406-07; see also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122
(1986) (showing of damage or loss "due merely to increased competition does not constitute" antitrust injury); Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 544 (1983) (risk of duplicative recoveries and the complexity of
apportionment of damges); Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476 (1982) (injury
must not be too remote); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977) (plaintiff must show more than the alleged injury's causal link to the market
violation).
14. 955 F.2d 641 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 96 (1992) (Chanute IV). Antitrust
standing differs from Article III standing, which requires an injury in fact sufficient to
satisfy the constitutional jurisdictional requirements. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 502-08 (1975) (a plaintiff seeking to challenge exclusionary zoning practices must
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Although the Tenth Circuit has recently begun to consider the
multi-factor standards, it still essentially utilizes a two-prong test to determine standing in antitrust cases. 15 To meet the first prong, the plaintiff must allege an antitrust injury, 16 which is an "injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which
makes defendants' acts unlawful.' 17 Injury requires a reduction in competition. Thus the Supreme Court has denied relief to plaintiffs whose
claimed injury resulted from heightened rather than lessened competition.18 Courts have found antitrust injury lacking in cases where the
plaintiff's injury was deemed to be wholly unrelated to the alleged antitrust violation,1 9 or where the defendant's conduct injured the plaintiff
but had no effect on competition.2 0 Moreover, a violation of antitrust
laws without injury to the plaintiff has not been sufficient to confer
2
standing. '
Even with the requisite injury, a party may still not be a proper
22
plaintiff under section 4 of the Clayton Act if the injury is too remote.
Thus, under the second, prong of the Tenth Circuit's antitrust standing
test, the plaintiff must show that the antitrust injury resulted directly from
defendant's violation of antitrust laws.2 3 This standard has mainly
allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that such practices actually harmed the plaintiff). See generally William E. Mooz, Jr., Tenth Circuit Antitrust Law: Recent Developments and
Possible Future Trends, 69 DENv. U. L. REV. 807, 807-08 (1992) (Article III standing requirements must be satisfied before court can address antitrust standing).
15. Chanute IV, 955 F.2d at 652; see also Sharp, 967 F.2d at 407 n.2 (the multi-factor
standard validates, but gives more specificity to, the inquiry of the Tenth Circuit's two-part
test).
16. Sharp, 967 F.2d at 407 n.2. Professors Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp
state that requiring antitrust injury serves two important functions:
[First, it] forces the parties and the court to reason closely about the nature of the
antitrust violation alleged in order to test whether the injury and damages
claimed by the plaintiff match the rationale for finding any violation in the first
place .... The second, and more particular, function of the antitrust injury requirement is to make clear that injuries resulting from [increased] competition
will not support either damage or equity actions by private parties under the antitrust laws.
PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw
334.2a (Supp. 1992).
17. Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489. The Court reiterated this requirement in a later
decision in which it held that the antitrust injury requirement must be satisfied in private
equity suits as well as in damage actions. Cargill, Inc., 479 U.S. at 110-12.
18. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884, 1891-92
(1990); Cargill, Inc., 479 U.S. at 116; Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 488.
19. See, e.g., Fischer v. NWA, Inc., 883 F.2d 594, 600 (8th Cir. 1989) (losses resulted
from elimination of schedule redundancy, not Northwest Airline's acquisition of market
power), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990).
20. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTrRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS 652 (3d ed. 1992)
(hereinafter ABA ANTITRUST SECToN).

21. Central Nat'l Bank v. Rainbolt, 720 F.2d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 1983).
22. Cargill, Inc., 479 U.S. at 110 n.5.
23. Sharp, 967 F.2d at 407 n.2; see also Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 899
F.2d 951, 962 n.15 (10th Cir.) ("An injury which is merely causally linked in some way to
an alleged antitrust violation is insufficient."), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990). The req•uisite causality requirement has customarily been analyzed under either of two alternative
tests: (1) was the plaintiff's injury direct or (2) was the plaintiff within the target area of
the defendant's violation. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, 334a. The target area
test required the plaintiff to show that he was within the area of the economy which was
endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry. Confer-
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served to deny standing to a plaintiff whose injury was indirect; for instance, when the injury was to a separate party, who was the more imme24
diate victim of the defendant's violation.
Given the Supreme Court's multi-factor considerations for antitrust
standing, the Tenth Circuit has recently begun' to consider, in addition
to the two-prong test, the potential for duplicative or speculative damages and the complexity of apportioning damages. 25 However, while
these criteria have been listed and evaluated separately, most decisions
turn on the question of antitrust injury, 26 and to a lesser extent, the
directness of the injury.
A.

Antitrust Standing in the Employment Context: Sharp v. United Airlines,
27
Inc.
1. Facts

A group of former pilots, flight attendants, and other employees of
Frontier Airlines brought antitrust claims, alleging that United Airlines
drove Frontier into bankruptcy. The plaintiffs argued that United had
engaged in anticompetitive behavior which caused Frontier to fail,
28
thereby injuring plaintiffs.
Frontier and United were competitors in the volatile airline industry. Each had hub operations at Stapleton International Airport in Denver, Colorado. As part of its operations, United maintained a
computerized reservation system (CRS), which enabled travel agents to
book and sell tickets on various airlines. 2 9 Frontier participated in
United's CRS, which was one of a number of such systems used in the
30
airline industry.
The employees alleged that United had monopoly power in the
Denver CRS market, overcharged Frontier for its participation in the
system, and caused the CRS to operate unfairly in its ticket sales to the
ence of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54-55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 919 (1952); see also Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 433 F.2d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir.
1970) (plaintiff who sold films to defendant for percentage of subsequent distribution revenues had standing under target area test), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971). The Sixth
Circuit abandoned both the direct injury and target area tests and instead required that
the plaintiff allege injury in fact and that "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant was arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d
1142, 1151 (6th Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court has yet to adopt any one of the tests. See
McCready, 457 U.S. at 476 n. 12 (noting the varying standing tests developed by the circuits,
including "directness of injury," "zone of interests" and "target area" tests, but declining
to evaluate or adopt any particular approach); Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 536
n.33 (noting different standing tests but refusing to adopt any of them).
24. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 16,

334c.

25. See Sharp, 967 F.2d at 409-10.
26. ABA AN'rITRusT SECTION, supra note 20, at 663.
27. 967 F.2d 404 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 464 (1992).
28. Id. at 405.
29. Id. This particular system consisted of computer terminals located in subscribing
travel agencies, was available to these travel agents for a fee and permitted ticket sales on
both Frontier and United. Id.
30. Id.
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detriment of Frontier."' Plaintiffs also alleged that the decision of
United to buy Frontier's assets and to renege on its purchase of Frontier
stock3 2 caused the airline to fail, costing the plaintiffs their jobs. The
plaintiffs asserted that United's conduct violated sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act and sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act. s" The trial court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
34
which relief could be granted.
2.

Majority Opinion

On appeal, United argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their antitrust claims. The Tenth Circuit agreed, concluding that
the employees failed to satisfy the two-prong test, primarily the injury
requirement, as well as the other factors associated with antitrust
standing.
In attempting to show antitrust injury, the plaintiffs relied on Adams
v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.3 5 In that case, former employees of a
defunct airline, Laker Airways, brought antitrust claims alleging that a
group of airlines and an airline manufacturer conspired to drive Laker
out of business, thereby depriving them of theirjobs.36 The Adams court
concluded that plaintiffs had alleged an antitrust injury; however, it 3held
7
that the other relevant factors compelled a finding of no standing.
In Sharp, the Tenth Circuit declined to follow the portion of the
Adams decision supporting the finding that similarly situated airline employees had suffered antitrust injury. 38 The Adams decision conflicted
with Tenth Circuit precedent. In Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,39 the
Tenth Circuit decided that salaried employees were "not within the area
of competitive economy protected against unlawful mergers". 40 In Jones
v. Ford Motor Co.,41 the Tenth Circuit indicated that it was settled law
that employees did not have standing to sue for antitrust violations
31. Id. at 405-06.
32. Id. at 406. In particular, plaintiffs argued that the asset sales were distress sales
made by Frontier at less than fair market value, and that United purposefully failed to
fulfill the stock purchase agreement. Id.
33. Plaintiffs also asserted state antitrust claims, breach of contract claims, and a claim
that United had intentionally interfered with plaintiffs' prospective business by diverting
passengers away from Frontier to United through improper manipulation of the Apollo
CRS system. Id.
34.

Id.

35. 828 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
36. Id. at 24.
37. Id. at 26-27. The Adams court noted that not only were the employees' injuries
one step removed from those of Laker, the immediate victim of the antitrust violation, but
that Laker was a superior plaintiff and had in fact brought and settled its own antitrust suit
against the same defendants. Id. at 29-30.
38. Sharp, 967 F.2d at 407.
39. 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973). In Reibert, an employee
sought treble damages under the Clayton Act for his loss of employment following an
allegedly unlawful merger between his employer, Sinclair Oil, and Atlantic Richfield. Id. at
727-28.
40. Id. at 732.
41. 599 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1979).
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which had injured their employer. 4 2
The plaintiffs in Sharp tried to distinguish these cases, arguing that
they applied only to employee suits against an employer. The court of
appeals rejected this proposition, however, indicating that no such limitation existed. Instead, they stood for the broad proposition that employees could not establish an antitrust injury when they lost their
employment "as a result of some allegedly anticompetitive activity directed at or involving their employer." 43 The court concluded that, due
to the tangential nature of the injury, the plaintiffs had not established
44
an antitrust injury based on their loss of employment.
Even had the employees established antitrust injury, the Sharp court
determined that the other factors relevant to standing were not present.
Under the second prong of the antitrust standing test, the court analyzed the directness of the connection between the plaintiffs' injuries
and the market restraint which had resulted from the alleged antitrust
violations.4 5 Relying on Adams, in which the D.C. Circuit held that the
injury the employees suffered was indirect because it was one step removed from the harm to Laker, 4 6 and prior Tenth Circuit 4 7 and
Supreme Court4 8 decisions, the Sharp court decided that the plaintiffs'
49
injuries were at most indirect.
Finally, the court analyzed several of the other factors relevant to
42. Id. at 397.
43. Sharp, 967 F.2d at 408. The court recognized that a different result-may have been
reached if the plaintiff-employees were "in essence 'quasi-businessmen operating in a market carved out by their own aggressiveness and salesmanship qualities. Thus when their
employers engaged in anti-competitive practices, the employees were directly injured by
these violations.' " Id. at 408 n.4 (quoting Reibert, 471 F.2d at 730). The court concluded
that this exception did not apply since plaintiff's injury was "tangential to the direct injury
allegedly suffered by Frontier." Id. Areeda and Hovenkamp state that they would support
antitrust standing where the right of employment is a protected interest within the substantive antitrust violation. "The employment interest is protected by the substantive
rules concerned with competition in the plaintiff's labor market but not necessarily by, say,
antimerger or price-fixing rules addressed to a product market that is not very closely
linked to the plaintiff's labor market." AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 16, $ 338a.

44. Sharp, 967 F.2d at 408 n.4.
45. Id. at 407 n.2, 408-09.
46. Adams v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 828 F.2d 24, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988). The Adams court observed that the conspirators allegedly
forced the firm to its knees. "Whenever that happens to a firm, the web of contracts and
relationships which form the essence of the firm will be dismantled. Astute counsel should
not be able, merely by feats of characterization, to confer standing on all participants in
that web." Id.
47. See Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 599 F.2d 394, 397 (10th Cir. 1979) (direct injury
does not include the loss of a job with a corporation or a reduction in an investment in
stock); Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727, 731 (10th Cir.) ("If there is any
antitrust violation, it is directed toward the petroleum industry ....
The first element,
causal connection between violation and injury, is lacking because [plaintiff] cannot show
that any antitrust violations directly injured him."), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973).
48. See Air Courier Conference of Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, 111 S. Ct.
913,920 n.5 (1991) ("Employees have generally been denied standing to enforce competition laws because they lack competitive and direct injury."); Associated Gen. Contractors,
Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 541 n.6 (1983) (Court observed that "a number of decisions have denied standing to employees with merely derivative injuries.")
49. Sharp, 967 F.2d at 409.
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antitrust standing: the potential for duplicative or speculative damages
and the complexity of apportioning damages. In the exceptionally volatile airline industry, characterized by frequent mergers and bankruptcies, an airline's survival or the continued employment of employees was
too. indefinite to calculate damages. 50 In addition, allowing employees
to have standing would risk duplicative recoveries or the necessity of
apportioning damages. 5 1 In summation, the Sharp decision indicated
that employees, who lost their employment as the result of some anticompetitive activity directed at or involving their employer, lacked
standing in the Tenth Circuit to assert federal and state antitrust claims
against their former employer's competitor.
3.

Analysis

In Sharp, the court correctly rejected plaintiffs' claim that antitrust
injury resulted from their loss of employment. Although not explicitly
articulating its rationale, the court apparently decided that the alleged
antitrust violation occurred in the air transportation and CRS markets,
but that the alleged injury was in the employment market. As members
only of the employment market, the plaintiffs were unable to establish
antitrust injury because the violation occurred in the air transportation
and CRS markets, not the employment market. Rather than broadly
holding that employees never have standing, this decision actually indicates that as long as the alleged antitrust violation occurred in another
market, employees will not be able to establish antitrust injury, regardless of the severity of their actual injury. If in fact the violation occurred
in the employment market, it is probable that employees would have
standing.
The motivating factor behind the court's decision appears to be a
concern for unlimited plaintiffs and rampant litigation. The court noted
that if it were to permit standing in this case, "there would be no principled way to cut off a myriad of other indirect claimants, such as suppliers
of Frontier Airlines or creditors, each of whom could claim that their
business was somehow impacted or adversely affected by Frontier's demise." 52 Moreover, the court's outcome is consistent with other decisions, which generally deny standing to employees, officers or
stockholders of a corporation injured by an antitrust violation. 53 Since
the injury to the plaintiffs was merely derivative of the injury to their
50. Id. The wholeness of each plaintiff would have depended on the length of their
employment, future salary level, and ability to obtain comparable employment in the airlines industry. Adams, 828 F.2d at 30.
51. Sharp, 967 F.2d at 410. In addition, the court rejected plaintiffs' argument that,
despite dismissal of their complaint for lack of standing under the federal antitrust laws,
the court should permit their state law antitrust claims to proceed. Id.
52. Id. at 409.
53. See, e.g., Southwest Suburban Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n,
830 F.2d 1374, 1378 (7th Cir. 1987) (officer of corporation); Eagle v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc.,
812 F.2d 538, 541-42 (9th Cir. 1987) (employees); Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.
704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910) (stockholder); Weatherby v. RCA Corp., 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
68,078 (N.D.N.Y. May 9, 1986) (shareholders, employees).
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employer, the court correctly held that such employees lacked standing
to sue their employer's 'competitor for an alleged antitrust violation.
III.

REFUSALS TO DEAL AND RESTRAINTS OF TRADE

The Tenth Circuit analyzed the elements of tying arrangements and
the essential facilities doctrine in City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas
Co. 54 The court held, in a proposition unique to the Tenth Circuit, that
a contract involving only a customer and the seller cannot constitute an
illegal tying arrangement. 5 5 In addition, the court applied the essential
facilities doctrine and concluded that the natural gas purchasers did not
suffer a "severe handicap" since the gas company offered the gas at fed56
erally approved prices.
Congress enacted the Sherman Act as a means of safeguarding general competitive conditions rather than protecting specific competitors. 57 This concern was reiterated in the language of the Sherman Act.
Section 1 prohibits contracts, combinations and conspiracies in restraint
of trade.5 8 Section 2 of the Sherman Act proscribes certain monopolies,
attempts to monopolize and conspiracies to monopolize. 59 These two
sections focus on different problems: section 1 deals with concerted ac60
tivity; section 2 concerns unilateral activity.
54.

955 F.2d 641 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992) (Chanute IV).
55. Id. at 650.
56. Id. at 648-49.
57. See, e.g., Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 370 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988). The Supreme Court has succinctly stated the purpose of the Sherman Act:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It
rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will
yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social
institutions. But even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is competition.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
58. 15 U.S.C § 1 (1988). Section 1 of the Sherman Act states, in relevant part, "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
Id. Both criminal and civil sanctions may be imposed for § 1 violations. In addition, violations of § 1 may be enjoined pursuant to § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1988),
and persons injured in their business or property by reason of a violation may recover
treble damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
59. Id. § 2. Section 2 of the Sherman Act states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred
thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
60. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 540-41 (9th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992).
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Restraints of Trade: Tying Arrangements

Section 1, read literally, would prohibit all concerted activity in restraint of trade. 6 1 The Supreme Court, however, has construed this section to condemn only those restraints that unreasonably restrict
62
competition.
Tying arrangements represent one form of restraint that can violate
section 1. A tying arrangement is "an agreement by a party to sell one
product [the tying product] but only on the condition that the buyer also
purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not
purchase that product from any other supplier."' 6 3 A form of exclusive
dealing, a tying arrangement restricts the purchaser's freedom to buy
products from sources other than the seller. 64 Usually the seller requires the buyer to purchase or lease a different product as a condition
of the purchase. The product may be complementary or supplementary
65
to the originally supplied item or may be completely unrelated.
An element of an illegal tying arrangement requires proof of two
separate and distinct products. 6 6 The availability of one product or service must be conditioned upon the purchase of another. 67 The seller
must also have the market power to "force" the purchaser to act differently than it would in a competitive market. 6 8
61. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88
(1978).
62. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
63. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5-6. This decision has met with recent approval
by the Supreme Court in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct.
2072, 2079 (1992).
court articulated the competitive harm resulting from tying
64. The Northern Pacific
arrangements:
[Tying arrangements] deny competitors free access to the market for the tied
product, not because the party imposing the tying requirements has a better
product or a lower price but because of his power or leverage in another market.
At the same time buyers are forced to forgo their free choice between competing
products.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 6.
65. 2 Louis ALTMAN & RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 10.18, at 104 (4th ed. 1985 & 1992 Supp.). Often tying arrangements are employed to boost the sales of a particular product that lacks demand. Id.
66. Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21 (1984) (it is "clear that a tying
arrangement cannot exist unless two separate product markets have been linked."). Altman lists four criteria used in determining the relation or distinction of two products: (1)
trade usage or practice in the field; (2) sale of a consistently homogeneous combination of
the two products; (3) lump sum billing for the combination; and (4) existence of other
related products not included in the unit. 2 ALTMAN & CALLMAN, supra note 65, § 10.18, at
106.
67. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962); see Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 356
U.S. at 6 n.4 ("where the buyer is free to take either product by itself there is no tying
problem.").
68. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 466 U.S. at 13-14; see also Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at
2079 (noting that a violation occurs "if the seller has 'appreciable economic power' in the
tying product market and if the arrangement affects a substantial volume of commerce in
the tied market") (citations omitted); Fox Motors, Inc. v. Mazda Distributors, Inc., 806
F.2d 953, 957 (10th Cir. 1986) (finding that tying arrangement violates the antitrust laws
when a dominant seller exploits his control over a market to force buyers to purchase an
unwanted product).
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Generally, courts will decide that a tying arrangement violates the
antitrust laws if: (1) the probable effect is to "substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce;" 69 (2) if
it results in an unreasonable restraint that effects a substantial amount of
interstite commerce; 70 or (3) if it is shown to be "in conflict with the
basic policies" of the antitrust laws. 7 1 Courts have generally found an72
ticompetitive tying arrangements unlawful per se.
B.

Refusals To Deal: Essential Facilities Doctrine

While section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits only contracts, combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade, section 2 prohibits unilateral monopolization and attempted monopolization, as well as
monopolization by combination or conspiracy. 73 To enforce this prohibition in refusal to deal cases, courts have looked to the essential facilities doctrine. 7 4 Established by the Supreme Court only twenty-two
.1
69. A violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988). Section 3, in
relevant part, forbids any person:
[T]o lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented... or
fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the
condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall
not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other
commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect
of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantiallylessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce.

Id. (emphasis added).
Because § 3 of the Clayton Act only applies when both the tying and tied products are
"goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities," tying arrangements involving such intangibles as medical services, credit, business and personal services, and trademarks or franchises cannot be challenged under § 3, although they still may
be challenged under § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 5 of the FTC Act. ABA ANTITRUST
SECTION, supra note 20, at 133-34.
70. A violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
71. A violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1988). Section 5, in relevant part, provides: "(1) Unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
declared unlawful." Id.
72. See, e.g., Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969)
(tying arrangements "generally serve no legitimate business purpose that cannot be
achieved in some less restrictive way."); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,
305-06 (1949) (such arrangements "serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of
competition."); International Salt Co. V. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) ("it is
unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market.") The American Bar Association Antitrust Section notes that while tying arrangements are classified as
per se illegal, "the test used to determine whether the per se rule should be applied to a
particular arrangement is in practice very similar to a rule of reason inquiry, because a
number of market related inquiries must be conducted before the per se rule is applied."
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 20, at 134.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
74. 955 F.2d 641 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992) (Chanute IV). A second,
unrelated test that courts use in refusal to deal cases under § 2 of the Sherman Act is the
intent test, which states that a "business is free to deal with whomever it pleases so long as
it has no 'purpose to create or maintain a monopoly.'" Byars v. Bluff City News Co:, 609
F.2d 843, 855 (6th Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307
(1919)); see also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985)
(applying the intent test when considering the circumstances under which a firm with mo-
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years after Congress enacted the Sherman Act, 75 the essential facilities
doctrine acknowledges that a business controlling a scarce resource has
a duty or obligation to allow reasonable access to the facility, even for
competitors. 76 Monopolists must make their facilities available on a
nondiscriminatory basis where a competitor cannot, in an economically
77
feasible manner, duplicate the facility.
The Tenth Circuit and other courts of appeals have adopted standards to determine whether a monopolist's action violates the essential
facilities doctrine. An antitrust plaintiff must show: "(1) control of the
essential facilities by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically
or reasonably to duplicate the facility; (3) the denial of the use of the
essential facilities to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the
facility." 78 The plaintiff must demonstrate the presence of each element; if even one element is missing, the doctrine is unavailing. 79 This
test differs from traditional monopolization analysis by de-emphasizing
intent and instead focusing on the surrounding market conditions. 80
C.

The Essential FacilitiesDoctrine and Tying Arrangements in the Natural
Gas Industry: City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co. 8 1
1. Facts

The plaintiffs, eight cities in Kansas (Cities) that operate their own
natural gas distribution systems, sued the defendant, Williams Natural
Gas Company, asserting antitrust violations. Specifically, the Cities protested Williams' termination of a temporary program that allowed the
purchase of gas from third-party suppliers, which Williams transported
82
over its pipeline.
Williams owned and operated the only interstate pipeline serving
the Cities. Each of the Cities had "full requirements" contracts with the
pipeline company. These contracts required the Cities to purchase all of
their natural gas from Williams, which in turn agreed to ensure the availnopoly power has a duty to continue a joint marketing arrangement with a smaller
competitor).
75. See United States v. St. Louis Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 410 (1912). The
Court found the practice of fourteen railroads, which denied access to certain railway
bridges crossing the Mississippi, violated the antitrust laws as a restraint of trade. The
defendants were required to allow competing railroads use of their facilities which were, as
a practical matter, impossible to duplicate. Id.
76. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1519 (10th
Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
77. McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365, 369 (10th Cir. 1988).
78. Id. (citing MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d
1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983)).
79. McKenzie, 854 F.2d at 370; see id. at 371 (essential facilities doctrine unavailing
since doctor failed to demonstrate the first element: that hospital controls facilities essential to his medical practice).
80. City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 678 F. Supp. 1517, 1531 (D. Kan.
1988) (Chanute I).
81. 955 F.2d 641 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 96 (1992) (Chanute IV).
82. Id. at 645.
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ability of a sufficient supply to meet the Cities' demands.8 3 Initially, Williams only transported its own gas over the pipeline, pursuant to the full
requirements contract. In December 1986, however, the gas company
sought regulatory approval from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to permit the transportation of gas from third-party
suppliers on a permanent basis. While awaiting approval, Williams initiated a temporary program to transport third-party gas for the Cities,
which then negotiated with, and entered into agreements for, gas from
84
other suppliers. The temporary program was allowed by FERC.
While the temporary program was in effect and the Cities were
purchasing third-party gas, Williams experienced difficulty paying its
suppliers.8 5 Williams ended the program and closed its pipeline to the
alternate suppliers in August 1987, although it continued to transport
certain third-party gas.8 6 In July 1988, FERC approved Williams' permanent plan, which enabled the Cities to purchase gas from any thirdparty supplier. Thereafter, the Cities negotiated with other suppliers to
obtain gas, which Williams transported over its pipeline.
The Cities brought suit under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,
alleging that Williams' conduct in closing its pipeline was an exercise of
its monopoly power, which injured the Cities by preventing them from
receiving transportation of a long-term, dependable supply of low-cost
natural gas from third-party suppliers over the pipeline.8 7 The Cities
sought antitrust damages for the time period, from August 1987 until
July 1988, during which Williams had closed its pipeline to the transportation of third-party gas until approval of the permanent plan.
Specifically, the Cities claimed that Williams' refusal to transport
gas unless the Cities purchased Williams' gas constituted an illegal tying
arrangement. 88 The Cities asserted that the requirements contracts tied
natural gas transportation (tying product) to natural gas sales (tied
product). 89 They also contended that Williams had the market power to
83. Id. at 646. The Cities purchased natural gas at wholesale and resold it to customers located in or near the Cities. Id.
84. Id. Otherwise the full requirements contracts would have precluded the Cities
from purchasing gas from third party suppliers even if Williams agreed to transport the
gas over its pipeline. The waiver did not release Williams from its obligation to serve the
Cities' full requirements on demand. Id.
85. Id. Apparently Williams had take-or-pay provisions in its contracts with the natural gas suppliers. These provisions obligated Williams to pay for certain volumes of gas
even though it was unable to sell that amount to its customers. Id. at 646 n.4.
86. Id at 646. The Cities presented evidence concerning Williams' decision to close
the pipeline. One expert testified that Williams closed its pipeline to control access to the
pipeline, to maintain a large portion of its sales function, and to increase profits. Another
economist stated that Williams experienced a significant erosion in its sales of natural gas
as customers converted to transported gas, that Williams earned a higher margin on sales
than it did on transportation, and that Williams ended its open access "in order to prevent
this loss of market share, and in order to prop up the price that it received for its product."
Id. at 654. Even though Williams ended the temporary program, FERC required Williams
to transport certain third-party gas that was still available to the Cities. Id. at 646 n.5.
87. City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 743 F. Supp. 1437, 1440 (D. Kan.
1990) (Chanute III).
88. Chanute IV, 955 F.2d at 649-50.
89. Id. at 650.
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"force" the Cities to do something they would not have done in a competitive market. 90 The district court granted summary judgment for
Williams, deciding that the Cities failed to show any agreement between
two or more parties and that Williams did not force the Cities to buy its
natural gas. 9 1
The Cities also alleged that Williams' decision to close the pipeline
violated section 2 of the Sherman Act under the essential facilities doctrine. 9 2 The Cities contended: that Williams was a monopolist in control of the pipeline that was essential to competition in the retail natural
gas market; that the Cities were unable to duplicate, practically or reasonably, the pipeline access; that Williams denied the Cities use of the
pipeline; and that it was feasible for Williams to have provided the Cities
with access to the pipeline. 93 The district court granted summary judgment for Williams, holding that the Cities were unable to establish the
second and third elements: the Cities' inability to duplicate the facility,
94
and Williams' denial of use of the facility to the Cities.
2.

Majority Opinion

The Cities appealed the district court's granting of summary judgment. In particular, the Cities alleged that Williams' actions violated
section 1 of the Sherman Act as an illegal tying arrangement and section
95
2 of that act under the essential facilities doctrine.
With respect to the tying claim, the Cities asserted that the district
court erred by not finding the existence of the necessary agreement between parties. They contended that the requirements contracts between
Williams and the Cities constituted the necessary agreement. The Cities
also argued that the approved third-party suppliers' gas did not provide
96
a defense to Williams forcing the sale of its natural gas.
The Tenth Circuit rejected these arguments. Rather, the court of
appeals reaffirmed its decision in McKenzie v. Mercy Hospital,9 7 that section 1 of the Sherman Act did not prohibit a tying arrangement imposed
by a single entity. 9 8 In McKenzie, the plaintiff asserted that an arrangement which linked two separate and distinct product markets together
was sufficient proof of a tying arrangement. The McKenzie court disagreed, deciding that the plaintiff must make a preliminary showing of a
90. Id.; see Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-14 (1984).
91. City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 68,967,
63,206 (D. Kan. Feb. 16, 1990) (Chanute II).
92. Chanute IV, 955 F.2d at 647.
93. It
94. Id. at 648.
95. Id. The Cities also contended that the full requirements contracts themselves violated the antitrust laws, thereby entitling the Cities to treble damages under § 4 of the
Clayton Act. See id. at 651-53. In addition, the Cities asserted a monopolization claim
under § 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 653-56.
96. Id. at 650.
97. 854 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1988). In McKenzie, the court acknowledged that a single
entity could establish a tying arrangement; however, the court decided that such an arrangement was not proscribed by section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 368.
98. Chanute IV, 955 F.2d at 650.
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conspiracy between two persons. 99 The Tenth Circuit applied this standard and indicated that the Cities needed to show that the alleged tying
arrangement resulted from concerted activity between separate
00
parties.'
The Cities did provide evidence to establish that Williams tied its
natural gas to its transportation facilities. They did not, however, show
that Williams acted in concert with any other entity. In fact, the Cities
named only themselves as the other party to the alleged conspiracy.
Therefore, the court of appeals decided that summaryjudgment was appropriate because the Cities failed to make the requisite preliminary
showing of a conspiracy necessary for their section 1 tying claim.' 0 '
With respect to the essential facilities doctrine, the court of appeals
held that the Cities failed to meet their burden since they failed to establish the second and third elements of the test. 10 2 They did not show
that Williams provided access to the pipeline on such unreasonable
terms as to constitute a denial of access.10 3 The Cities did not suffer a
severe handicap as a result of Williams having provided the Cities' full
10 4
requirements of natural gas rather than transporting third-party gas.
The court reasoned that Williams' supply of gas at FERC approved
prices provided the Cities with reasonable access to the pipelines. Such
reasonable access defeated the second element of the test since reasonable access was equivalent to practical duplication.10 5 Reasonable access also defeated the third element - denial of use of the facilities.
Since the Cities failed to prove the second and third elements, they did
not meet their burden of presenting evidence that Williams denied or
limited access to its pipeline solely to gain a competitive edge. Thus the
Tenth Circuit upheld the decision to grant summary judgment for Wil10 6
liams on the section 2 claim.
99. McKenzie, 854 F.2d at 367-68. According to the McKenzie decision, a violation of
section 1 required " 'unlawful conduct by two or more parties pursuant to an agreement.... Solely unilateral conduct, regardless of its anticompetitive effects, is not prohibited by Section 1.' " Id. at 367 (quoting Contractor Utility Sales Co. v. Certain-Teed
Prods. Corp., 638 F.2d 1061, 1074 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1029 (1985)).
100. Chanute IV, 955 F.2d at 650.
101. Id. at 650-51.
102. Id. at 648. The Cities asserted as error that the district court ignored its own
findings made at the preliminary hearing, that the evidence showed the facility could not
be physically duplicated and that the approved third-party suppliers' gas was not a feasible
substitute for other third-party gas. The Tenth Circuit rejected these arguments. The fact
the Cities prevailed at the preliminary injunction stage was not determinative in a summary judgment proceeding. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 649.
106. Id. In addition, the court of appeals granted summary judgement in favor of Williams on all other causes of action. The court determined that: (1) the Cities failed to
establish a monopolization claim in light of Williams' showing that its action was the result
of a legitimate business decision, id. at 653-56; and (2) the Cities failed to show antitrust
injury for purposes of standing, since Williams was not obligated to provide access to the
other suppliers in the first place, id. at 651-53.

ANTITRUST LA W

1993]
3.

653

Concurrence

Judge Seymour, in her concurrence, disagreed with the majority's
reliance on McKenzie as support for the proposition that section 1 did
not apply to a tying arrangement imposed by a single entity.' 0 7 Rather,
under the case law of the Tenth Circuit and other circuits, a buyer alleging that he had been coerced or forced by a seller into an illegal tying
arrangement stated the requisite combination or conspiracy under the
Sherman Act.' 0 8 The concurrence pointed to several cases to support
this position. In Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Industry, 10 9 the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that a plaintiff who contended that a seller unlawfully refused to deal as a means of enforcing an anticompetitive practice, such as tying or price-fixing, could have established the requisite
combination or conspiracy by showing that he himself unwillingly complied with the practice." 0 On rehearing, where the defendant urged the
court to reconsider its conclusion that the record contained evidence of
a tying conspiracy, the court indicated that a combination occurs between a seller and buyers whose acquiescence in the seller's firmly enforced restraints was induced by "the communicated danger of
termination." I I
The concurrence noted that the Cities alleged that Williams illegally
tied the purchase of natural gas to its transportation and that they were
forced to accept the arrangement because they had no alternative
source. However, since Williams' gas was sold at FERC approved
prices, and given that the Cities could have obtained cheaper third-party
gas throughout this period, Williams could not have forced the Cities to
acquiesce. 12 Only because the Cities failed to state facts from which
the trier could have found forcing did the concurrence conclude that
summary judgement was appropriate on the tying claim.
4.

Analysis

In rejecting the Cities' tying claim, the majority held that a tying
arrangement imposed by a single entity did not violate section 1 of the
Sherman Act since there was no conspiracy between independent parties. This statement misinterprets the section 1 contract, combination
or conspiracy requirement. Most courts that have considered the issue
have found agreement between the seller and the buyer sufficient to es107. Id. at 658 (Seymour, J., concurring). Judge Seymour indicated that McKenzie was
factually distinguishable, and therefore not controlling, because in that case the plaintiff
himself did not and could not agree to the illegal arrangement. Id. at 658 n.l. Judge
Seymour agreed with most of the majority opinion, including the decision reached under
the essential facilities doctrine. However, she disagreed with the majority's analysis of the
antitrust standing and antitrust injury issue. See id. at 659-60.
108. Id. at 658-59.

109. 729 F.2d 676, 686 (10th Cir. 1984).
110. Id The Black Gold court relied on United States v. Parke, Davis and Co., 362 U.S.
29 (1960), for this statement.
111. Chanute IV, 955 F.2d at 659.
112. Id.
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tablish the requisite conspiracy." l 3 They have not required evidence
that a separate third party conspired with the seller. As the concurring
opinion noted, even Tenth Circuit precedent indicated that a single entity could prove the requisite combination or conspiracy "by showing
that he himself unwillingly complied with the practice, or by showing that
although he refused to acquiesce, other buyers agreed to the arrange' 14
ment under threat of termination."
A subsequent district court opinion underscored the problem with
Chanute and McKenzie. By requiring proof of the "archetypical conspiracy to maintain a Section 1 claim ... [these' cases] seemingly erase the
words 'contract' and 'combination' . . . from Section 1. Contracts in
restraint of trade [between a customer and seller] are thereby effectively
removed from Section l's reach, even though embraced by its express
terms." 115
Applying the more recognized standard could have resulted in a different outcome if the Cities had alleged sufficient facts to support the
finding of a tying arrangement. Whereas the plaintiff in Black Gold refused to buy goods under the alleged unlawful tying arrangement, and
could not base the requisite combination or conspiracy on any agreement it had with the defendant," 6 the Cities potentially bought goods
under the alleged tying arrangement and, therefore, could base the requisite combination or conspiracy on an agreement they had with
Williams.
The recent Supreme Court decision, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, Inc.,' 17 supports the conclusion that a buyer who alleges that he has been forced by a seller into an illegal tying arrangement has stated the requisite combination or conspiracy under section 1
of the Sherman Act." 8 The Supreme Court determined that a reason113. Black Gold, Ltd., 729 F.2d at 686; see Smith Mach. Co. v. Hesston Corp., 878 F.2d
1290, 1294 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting that although a dealer refused to accede to manufacturer's request, the dealer could have shown an agreement between manufacturer and
other dealer), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1073 (1990); see also Perma Life Mufflers Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 142 (1968) ("petitioner can clearly charge a combination
between Midas and himself, as of the day he unwillingly complied with the restrictive
franchise agreements .. ");Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 150 n.6 (1968) ("petitioner could have claimed a combination between respondent and himself, at least as of
the day he unwillingly complied with respondent's advertised price."); Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 670 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that "unwilling compliance" between franchisees and franchisor satisfied the joint action requirement of section
1), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1129 (1986). But cf. Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Lab., Inc., 787 F.
Supp. 179 (D. Colo. 1992) (court constrained to follow Tenth Circuit's erroneous requirement of concerted action between separate parties).
114. Chanute IV, 955 F.2d at 659 (Seymour, J., concurring) (citing Black Gold, Ltd., 729
F.2d at 686) (emphasis in original).
115. Systemcare, Inc., 787 F. Supp. at 182.
116. Black Gold, Ltd. 729 F.2d at 686.
117. 112 S.Ct. 2072 (1992).
118. See Chanute IV, 955 F.2d at 658-59 (Seymour, J., concurring). In Eastman Kodak Co.,
after independent service organizations began servicing copying and micrographic equipment manufactured by Kodak, Kodak adopted policies to limit the availability to the independent service organizations of replacement parts for its equipment and to make it
more difficult for those companies to compete with Kodak in servicing such equipment.
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able trier of fact could find, first, that service and parts were two distinct
products in light of evidence indicating that each had been, and continued in some circumstances to be, sold separately; and second, that Kodak tied the sale of the two products in light of evidence indicating that
it sold parts to third parties only if they agreed not to buy service from
the independent service organizations. 1 9 The Court rejected Kodak's
characterization of the sale as a unilateral refusal to deal.120 Implicit in
the analysis, third-party conspirators could bring a tying claim based on
an agreement between Kodak and themselves. Eastman Kodak Co., therefore, supports the proposition that a buyer who was forced into an illegal tying arrangement can state the requisite combination or conspiracy
by showing that he himself complied with the practice.
With respect to the essential facilities claim, the Chanute court purported to apply the four-part test. However, the court actually relied on
a separate severe handicap standard to analyze both the second and
third elements: the Cities' inability to reasonably duplicate the pipeline
access; and Williams' denial of access to the pipeline. Since the Cities
suffered no severe handicap they failed to establish both the second and
third elements. 12'

The court's analysis, and the four-part test itself, would have been
more accurate if the severe handicap standard had been applied to the
second element only, not the third. The first element, the monopolist's
control of the essential facility, and the third element, the denial of access to the essential facility, focus on the nature of the conduct itself.
Under the second element, the competitor's inability to duplicate access
to the facility, and the fourth element, the feasibility of providing the
competitor access to the facilities, the court analyzes the effect of that
conduct on competition. As a practical way to analyze the detrimental
effect on competition, the severe handicap standard asks whether the
inability to duplicate the facilities imposed a severe handicap on competition. 12 2 Because it focuses on the effect the described conduct has on
competition, not on the nature of the conduct itself, the severe handicap
standard really only answers the questions posed in the second and
fourth elements. By limiting its use of the severe handicap standard to
these elements, the Tenth Circuit would clarify its analysis under the
essential facilities doctrine.
The independent service organizations brought suit, alleging that Kodak had unlawfully
tied the sale of service for its machines to the sale of parts, in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2077-78.
119.

Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S. Ct. at 2079-80.

120.

Id. at 2080 n.8.

121. Chanute IV, 955 F.2d at 648-49.
122. Other circuits have applied a severe handicap standard to determine the effect of
denial of access. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (1991)
(holding that a successful essential facilities plaintiff must prove that denial of access
caused it "severe handicap"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992); Twin Laboratories, Inc. v.
Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566 (2nd Cir. 1990); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570
F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
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MONOPOLIZATION - THE RELEVANT MARKET

In TV Communications Network, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc.,123
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the plaintiff could
not establish section 2 monopolization claims because of its failure to
define properly the relevant market. Because it defined the relevant
market as a single product, the plaintiff failed, as a matter of law, to
allege a relevant market that the defendant was capable of
24
monopolizing. 1
The Supreme Court usually defines the offense of unlawful monopolization as the possession of monopoly or market power, plus deliberate conduct intended to acquire, use, or preserve that power.' 2 5 The
primary dilemma facing courts is that many of the same methods that
may be used to acquire or maintain monopoly power, such as charging
lower prices, exercising discretion when choosing customers, and introducing new products, are also the kinds of competitive strategies that
26
the antitrust laws are designed to encourage.'
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has defined monopoly or market
power as "the power to control market prices or to exclude competition." 12 7 In the Tenth Circuit, however, monopoly power requires both
control over prices and the ability to exclude competition. 12 8 Since the
ability to control prices ultimately depends on the absence of competi29
tion, the distinction is probably more theoretical than real. 1
An essential step to determining a company's market power is to
define the relevant market in which the power over prices or competition is to be appraised. '3 0 The relevant market is the "area of effective
competition" within which the defendant operates. 13 1 The purpose in
defining the relevant market is "to identify the firms that compete with
each other in a given product and geographic area in order to determine
123. 964 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 601 (1992).
124. Id. at 1025.
125. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596 n.19
(1985).
126. ABA ANTITUST SECTION, supra note 20, at 196.

127. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956); see'also
NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984) (stating that
market power is the "ability to raise prices above those that would be charged in a competitive market").
128. Shoppin' Bag, Inc. v. Dillon Cos., 783 F.2d 159, 164 (10th Cir. 1986); accord
Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 966-67 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S.
1005 (1990). The Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and D.C. Circuits have also required both
elements. See ABA Antitrust Section, supra note 20, at 196-97 n.8 (citing Borough of Lansdale v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 692 F.2d 307, 311 (3d Cir. 1982); Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 756 F.2d 1183, 1188 (5th Cir. 1985); Richter Concrete Corp. v.
Hilltop Concrete Corp., 691 F.2d 818, 826 (6th Cir. 1982); National Reporting Co. v.
Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 1985); Neumann v. Reinforced
Earth Co., 786 F.2d 424, 430 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 851 (1986)).
129. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 20, at 196-97.
130. City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 955 F.2d 641, 654 (10th Cir.) cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992) (Chanute IV); see also Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach.
& Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965) ("Without a definition of that market there is no
way to measure [an alleged monopolist's] ability to lessen or destroy competition.")
131. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327-28 (1961).
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whether other firms can effectively constrain the price of the alleged monopolist." 13 2 A properly defined relevant market normally identifies
both the relevant product market and the relevant geographic
3
market.
The relevant product market includes those products that are "reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes."' 3 4 In
determining the reasonable interchangeability of products, courts consider the cross-elasticity of demand, which measures "the responsiveness of the sales of one product to price changes of the other."' 3 5 For
example, a relevant market defined in terms of user substitutes includes
"producers of identical products, of products with physical or brand differences entirely disregarded by consumers, and of products regarded
by consumers as such close substitutes that a slight relative price change
3 6
in one will induce intolerable shifts of demand away from the other."'
The latter products have a high cross-elasticity of demand and are pre3 7
sumptively in the same relevant product market.'
Relevant product markets generally cannot be limited to a manufacturer's own products, or to a single class of purchasers.138 In United
132. ABA ArrRusT SECTION, supra note 20, at 198. Professors Areeda and
Hovenkamp indicate that courts generally define the relevant market in terms of the legal
issue before the court: whether a defendant firm possesses monopoly power; whether a
merger of competitors creates a substantial risk that the resulting firm will either acquire
power over price or may be able to coordinate prices with its rivals at non-competitive
levels; or whether a transaction will reinforce any such threats to competition. AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 16,

518.1.

133. Chanute IV, 955 F.2d at 654.
134. Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 893 (10th Cir. 1991); see
E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 404 ("That market is composed of products that
have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced - price,
use and qualities considered.")
135. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. at 400; see also Westman Comm'n Co. v.
Hobart Int'l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1220-21 (10th Cir. 1986) (analyzing cross-elasticity of
demand), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988). Elasticity and inelasticity of demand relate to
the freedom of demand within the relative product market. In an elastic market, buyers
are able to chose freely what products they wish to buy. In an inelastic market, buyers are
limited in their choices due to inadequate selections and excessive prices. These factors
are important with respect to the court's determination of the relevant product market and
the optimum cross-elasticity of demand, which is the extent to which a consumer is able to
shift freely between two or more products. 16AJuLIAN 0. VoN KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: ANrTRUST TRADE LAWs AND TRADE REGULATION § 6G.04[1], 6G-37 (1991).
136. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 16,
525a.
137. Id.
138. Many courts have determined that the relevant market cannot consist of a single
manufacturer's product. See, e.g., Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 959 F.2d 468 (3d Cir.) (finding that in an alleged tying arrangement, the relevant
market was all automobiles manufactured in the United States, not merely the automobile
manufacturer's own brand), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 196 (1992); International Logistics
Group v. Chrysler Corp., 884 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1989) (Chrysler's own brands not relevant
market), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1066 (1990); Telex Corp. v. IBM, Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th
Cir.) (relevant market was all peripheral computer equipment, not merely those that were
plug-compatible with IBM central processing units), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975);
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 766 F. Supp. 670 (C.D. Ill. 1991) (M16 assault rifle not a relevant market since there were numerous competing products); Sun
Dun, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 740 F. Supp. 381 (D. Md. 1990) (rejecting claim that defendant could be guilty of monopolizing the distribution of its own brand of soft drink); Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F. Supp. 791 (D. Minn. 1989) (manufacturer's own brand of ice
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States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., the Court indicated that manufactures should not ordinarily be deemed to have monopolized their own
products.' 3 9 However, some courts have found the relevant product
market to be limited to, the products of a single supplier where they are
140
so unique as to have no reasonably interchangeable substitutes.
The relevant geographic market is defined as "the narrowest market
which is wide enough so that products from adjacent areas ... cannot
4
compete on substantial parity with those included in the market."' '
This fact-intensive determination involves an analysis of how far con42
sumers are willing travel to obtain the product at a lower price.1
Both the relevant geographic and product markets "can be determined only after a factual inquiry into the 'commercial realities' faced by
consumers."' 43 It is the plaintiff's burden to prove the relevant market,
and the evidence must set forth some basis to support the plaintiff's deficream not a relevant market); Disenos Artisticos E Industriales, S.A. v. Work, 714 F. Supp.
46 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (manufacturer's brand of porcelain figurines could not be relevant
market); Theatre Party Assocs. v. Shubert Org., 695 F. Supp. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Broadway theatre's own popular show not a relevant market; relevant market likely included all
Broadway shows, ballet, and perhaps even sporting events); Hendricks Music Co. v. Steinway, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 1501 (N.D. Il1. 1988) (refusing to recognize "concert and artist"
pianos, in which only Steinway and Yamaha pianos participated, as a distinct market).
139. 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956). The du Pont Court noted that:
[O]ne can theorize that we have monopolistic competition in every nonstandardized commodity with each manufacturer having power over the price and
production of his own product. However, this power that, let us say, automobile
or soft-drink manufacturers have over their trademarked products is not the
power that makes an illegal monopoly. Illegal power must be appraised in terms
of the competitive market for the product.
Id. (citations omitted).
140. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2072, 2090 (1992);
see also Parts and Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1988)
(finding market power in own brand of electric motors for tie-in purpose), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 847 (1989); National Ass'n of Pharmaceutical Mfrs., Inc. v. Ayerst Lab., 850 F.2d 904
(2d Cir. 1988) (suggesting that a particular branded drug, Inderal, could be a relevant
market); Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 121 (9th Cir. 1972) (defendant's own
differentiated products can constitute a relevant market if they are "so unique or so dominant in the market in which they compete that any action by the manufacturer to increase
his control over his product virtually assures that competition in the market will be destroyed."); cf. Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1991) (although a
single brand could conceivably be a relevant market, plaintiff did not meet burden of
showing that Ford tractors were not reasonably interchangeable with the tractors of competitors), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3034 (1992).
141. Westman Comm'n Co., 796 F.2d at 1222 (citations omitted). The outer boundary of
the relevant geographic market is reached, "if one were to raise the price of the product or
limit its volume of production, while demand held constant, and supply from other sources
beyond the boundary could not be expected to enter promptly enough and in large
enough quantities to restore the old price or volume." Satellite Television & Assoc. Resources, Inc. v. Continental Cablevision, Inc., 714 F.2d 351, 356 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027 (1984) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court noted that: "The
geographic market selected must.., both 'correspond to the commercial realities' of the
industry and be economically significant. Thus, although the geographic market in some
instances may encompass the entire Nation, under other circumstances it may be as small
as a single metropolitan area." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37
(1962) (citations omitted).
142. See Westman Comm'n Co., 796 F.2d at 1222.
143. Eastman Kodak Co., 112 S.Ct. at 2090 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 572 (1966)). Each market is defined from the perspective of the buyer, not the
seller. See Westman Comm'n Co., 796 F.2d at 1221.
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nition of the relevant product market. 14 4 The proper definition is generally a question for the trier of fact, and summary judgment is typically
inappropriate because the pertinent economic facts are usually disputed.
In some instances, however, the relevant market may be determined as a
matter of law, particularly in cases where the relevant economic facts are
not in dispute.14 5 Properly defining the relevant market is often the key
146
to a plaintiffs case under the Sherman Act.
A.

The Relevant Market in Denver Cable Television: TV Communications
47
Network, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc.1
1.

Facts

Plaintiff, TV Communications Network (TVCN), provided cable television for a fee to subscribers in metropolitan Denver, Colorado.
While most cable television operators distributed their programming
through coaxial cable, TVCN was a wireless cable operator that utilized
microwave transmission technology.' 4 8 Defendant Turner Network
Television (TNT) manufactured, produced and supplied video programming, including National Premium Sports Programming. 149 Since
1988, TNT has refused to allow TVCN to receive its programming in
order for TVCN to offer it to its subscribers. 150 TVCN discovered that
144. See Tarabishi v. McAlester Regional Hosp., 951 F.2d 1558, 1568 (10th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2996 (1992).
145. See, e.g., Key Fin. Planning Corp. v. ITT Life Ins. Corp., 828 F.2d 635, 643 (10th
Cir. 1987); Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 487 (5th Cir.
1984).
146. ABA ANTITRUST SEcTION, supra note 20, at 197-98. Over the past two decades, the
courts have expanded the requirement that an antitrust plaintiff engage in a proper market
power analysis, which means that virtually all antitrust cases now require some proof of
market power. Mooz, supra note 14, at 811. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc.
v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294-95 (1985) (market power analysis
required for rule of reason analysis in horizontal group boycott); Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-18 (1984) (market power analysis required for tying
arrangements); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977)
(non-price vertical restraints analyzed under rule of reason, which requires a determination of market power); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (section 2 monopolization and attempt to monopolize claims require a properly defined
relevant market). However, market power analysis is not required for per se violations of
the antitrust laws. See Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 968 n.24 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990).
147. 964 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 601 (1992).
148. Id. at 1023. Cable Television was "deregulated" in 1984. Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 521 (1988). For an article regarding cable industry
franchise agreements, see Daniel L. Brenner, Was Cable Television a Monopoly?, 42 FED.
COMM. L.J. 365 (1989).

149. TV Communications Network, Inc., 964 F.2d at 1023. There were several other original defendants, including ESPN, Capital Cities/ABC, Tele-Communications, United Artists Entertainment Co., American Television and Communications Corp., Scripps Howard
Cable Company, Scripps Howard Communications, and Mile High Cable Co., all of which
settled out of court. Id. at 1023 n.1.
150. Id. at 1024. TVCN alleged that TNT refused to let it carry TNT programming
because the wireless system posed a competitive threat to conventional cable systems.
TVCN claimed cable programmers and system owner conspired to squeeze it out of business because it encroached on some systems' franchise areas. Adriel Bettelheim, High
Court Rejects Cable TV Lawsuit, DENV. POST, Dec. 1, 1992, at C1.
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many potential subscribers would not subscribe until TVCN made the
TNT channel available. In addition, existing subscribers threatened to
terminate their subscription if the TNT channel was not made
available. 15'
TVCN filed the complaint to force TNT to make its programming
available to TVCN. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs complaint
15 2
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
2.

Majority Opinion

TVCN appealed, asserting monopolization, attempt to monopolize,
and conspiracy to monopolize claims under section 2 of the Sherman
Act. 153 To establish a monopolization claim, TVCN must have shown
"the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market" and "the
willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident."' 54 An actionable attempt to monopolize claim required a properly defined relevant market, a dangerous
probability of success in monopolizing the relevant market, the specific
55
intent to monopolize, and conduct in furtherance of such an attempt.'
A conspiracy to monopolize required the existence of a combination or
conspiracy to monopolize the relevant market. 1 56 Therefore, all three
57
of the section 2 claims required a properly defined relevant market. .
In defining the relevant market, TVCN's complaint alleged that
TNT monopolized the market for the TNT channel in Denver. TVCN
claimed that TNT had complete control and a 100% market share of the
TNT market. 158 The Tenth Circuit rejected this market definition. Relying on E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co.,159 the court of appeals deter151. TV Communications Network, 964 F.2d at 1024.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1024-27. The plaintiff also sought relief under § I of the Sherman Act for
the alleged conspiracy between TNT and other cable operators. Id. at 1027. The court
rejected the § 1 claim, holding that TVCN could not establish § I claims against TNT
based on price fixing, a group boycott, or refusal to deal. Id. at 1027-28. In addition, the
court dismissed the plaintiff's state law claims without prejudice following the dismissal of
the federal claims. Id. at 1028.
154. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
155. TV Communications Network, 964 F.2d at 1025.
156. See id. at 1026. In addition to proving the existence of a combination or conspiracy to monopolize, a plaintiff must prove three other elements in order to establish a claim
for conspiracy to monopolize: overt acts done in furtherance of the combination or conspiracy; an effect upon an appreciable amount of interstate commerce; and a specific intent
to monopolize. Id.
157. In addition to defining a relevant market for section two claims, a section one
plaintiff, utilizing the rule of reason standard, who cannot prove actual detrimental effects
on competition must properly define the relevant market. See Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 968 n.24 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990) ("there must
be sufficient evidence supporting the jury's finding of an agreement which unreasonably
restrained trade in the relevant market") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also Kaplan
v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286, 291 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Proof that the defendant's activities had an impact upon competition in a relevant market is an absolutely essential element
of the rule of reason case."), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 924 (1980).
158. TV Communications Network, 964 F.2d at 1025.
159. 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956). The court also relied on Key Fin. Planning Corp. v.
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mined that TVCN failed to allege a relevant market which TNT was
capable of monopolizing because "a company does not violate the Sherman Act by virtue of the natural monopoly itholds over its own
product."1 60
TVCN's definition of the relevant product market as one cable
programmer's channel was defective as a matter of law.16 1 Because it
did not allege a relevant market that TNT was capable of monopolizing
in violation of the antitrust laws, TVCN could not prove that TNT had a
dangerous probability of success of monopolizing the relevant market.
Based on the improperly defined market, the court affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the monopolization, attempt to monopolize, and
162
conspiracy to monopolize claims.
3.

Analysis

While the TV Communications Network court's holding that a relevant
product market cannot be a single manufacturer's product is consistent
with many other decisions, a recent Supreme Court decision indicates
that a single brand of a product can constitute a relevant product market
in certain circumstances.16 3 In Eastman Kodak Co., the Court disagreed
with Kodak's contention that, as a matter or law, a single brand of a
product or service could never be a relevant market under the Sherman
Act.164 Rather, the relevant market "is determined by the choices available to Kodak equipment owners," 1 6 5 who were the consumers. The
Supreme Court concluded that, since services and parts for Kodak
equipment were not interchangeable with those of other manufacturers,
the relevant market from the Kodak equipment owner's perspective was
ITT Life Ins. Corp., 828 F.2d 635, 643 (10th Cir. 1987), in which the Tenth Circuit held
that the defendant's life insurance policies did not constitute a relevant market, even
though the defendant paid higher advances to its agents than other insurers. The Key
FinancialPlanning Corp. court reasoned that nothing restrained competing insurers from
increasing their advances, if they needed to do so in order to retain good agents or make
more sales. Id.
160. TV CommunicationsNetwork, 964 F.2d at 1025; see Key Fin. PlanningCorp., 828 F.2d at
643.
161. TV CommunicationsNetwork, 964 F.2d at 1025. On appeal and contrary to the allegations in its amended complaint, TVCN asserted that the market for the TNT channel
was not the relevant market to consider. Rather, TVCN alleged that the relevant product
market was subscription television programming or sports programming. However, the
court, stating that the amended complaint must stand or fall on its own, rejected this assertion as a futile mischaracterization of the allegations in the amended complaint. Id.
162. Id. at 1028. Although not specifically rejecting the section 2 conspiracy to monopolize claim for failure to properly define the relevant product market, the court mentioned
the improperly defined market as a factor in the dismissal of the conspiracy to monopolize
claim. Id. Under its conspiracy to monopolize claim, TVCN alleged that the overt acts and
specific intent to monopolize were evidenced by denial of access to essential facilities for
the relevant TNT channel market in Denver, fixing prices, a group boycott, unreasonable
territorial allocations and exclusionary measures. Id. at 1026. The court decided that
TVCN failed on its conspiracy claim since the compliant did not provided facts to support
a conspiracy claim and did little more than recite the relevant antitrust laws. Id. at 102627.
163. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2090 (1992).
164. Id.
165. Id. (citations omitted).
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composed of only those companies that serviced Kodak machines. 166
Moreover, Eastman Kodak Co. essentially repudiated the TV Communications Network court's reliance on E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. as justification for invalidating a relevant market comprised of a single brand of a
product. In a footnote, the Court implicitly discouraged such use of:du
Pont. It pointed out that the du Pont Court did not reect the notion that a
relevant market could be limited to one brand. "The Court simply held
in du Pont that one brand does not necessarily constitute a relevant market
if substitutes are available. Here respondents contend there are no substitutes." 16 7 Thus the recent Supreme Court decision invalidated the
basis for part of the TV Communications Network holding and likely abrogated the Tenth Circuit's decision that a single product cannot, as a mat68
ter of law, constitute a relevant market.'
Factually, TV Communication Network would be similar to Eastman Kodak Co. if TVCN, like the respondents in Eastman Kodak Co., provided
sufficient evidence that there were no substitutes for the TNT channel.
But unlike Eastman Kodak Co., where Kodak equipment owners were
forced to purchase only Kodak replacement parts, TVCN was not forced
into a situation where it had to buy TNT. Moreover, there was no evidence that other sport programming was unavailable or unsatisfactory
to potential subscribers. Therefore, the two cases are factually distinguishable and, although the Tenth Circuit's broad statement that a single product cannot as a matter of law constitute the relevant market is
clearly not true, summary judgment was probably still appropriate.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Sharp, the Tenth Circuit determined that employees of an airline
allegedly driven into bankruptcy by another airline lacked standingto
assert antitrust claims against the competitor. In evaluating antitrust
standing, the Tenth Circuit utilized its two-part test, which required antitrust injury resulting directly from the antitrust violation, and for the
first time, analyzed the other elements mentioned in the Supreme
Court's multi-factor standard. The court held that the employees fdid
not establish antitrust injury by their loss of employment because any
injury was indirect, the damages were speculative, and there was risk of
duplicative recoveries if the employees were allowed standing. Essentially the case indicated that as long as the alleged antitrust violation
occurred in a market other than the employment market, the employees
could not establish antitrust injury.
The Chanute case addressed the use of the essential facilities doc166. Id.
167. Id. at 2090 n.30 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
168. Cf.Smalley & Co. v. Emerson & Cuming, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Colo. 1992)
(recognizing that a single product might constitute the relevant product market, but declining to extend Eastman Kodak Co. to allow a single product sold to a single customer,
given uncontested evidence of other consumers of that product, to represent the relevant
product market).

19931

ANTITRUST LA W

trine and tying claims in the natural gas industry. The court held that
several cities which purchased natural gas from the gas company failed
to show "severe handicap" and therefore could not recover under the
essential facilities doctrine. To make its analysis of the four-part essential facilities test less confusing, the court should have only applied the
severe handicap standard to the second element of the test: the inability
to duplicate reasonably access to the facility.' 6 9
The majority in Chanute also stated that section 1 of the Sherman
Act did not prohibit a tying arrangement imposed by a single entity.
However, as the concurrence noted, the requisite conspiracy, or combination could exist between the seller and a buyer when the buyer was
forced to agree to the arrangement. The Tenth Circuit needs to
reevaluate its position and recognize the possibility that acquiescence by
the buyer establishes the requisite conspiracy.
Finally, in TV Communications Network, the Tenth Circuit invalidated
the plaintiffs definition of the relevant product market. Section 2 monopolization, attempt to monopolize, and conspiracy to monopolize
claims require the plaintiff to properly define the relevant markets,
which include both product and geographic markets. The plaintiff defined the relevant product market as a single cable television channel.
The court rejected such a narrow definition as a matter of law, holding
that "a company does not violate the Sherman Act by virtue of the natural monopoly it holds over its own product."' 170 However, a recent
Supreme Court decision that a single brand can constitute a relevant
product market if there are no available substitutes limits this broad
Tenth Circuit precedent. While the result in the TV Communications Network decision would probably have been the same after Eastman Kodak
Co., the Tenth Circuit should allow for the possibility that a single product could constitute the relevant product market under the right
circumstances.
Mark D. Williamson

169. This standard should also be applied to the fourth element, however, the court
did not analyze this element.
170. TV Communications Network, Inc. v. Turner Network Television, Inc., 964 F.2d
1022, 1025 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 601 (1992) (citations omitted).

